M. Dentith 
The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories 

Conspiracy theories are a popular topic of conversation in everyday life but are often frowned upon in academic discussions. Looking at the recent spate of philosophical interest in conspiracy theories, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories looks at whether the assumption that belief in conspiracy theories is typically irrational is well founded

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Foreword; Charles Pigden Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 2. Conspiracy Theory Theories 3. Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theories 4. Some Problems with a General Definition 5. Conspirators, and What They Want 6. The Public Trust 7. The Trouble with Authority 8. Should We Prefer Official Theories? 9. Evidence and Conspiracy Theories 10. The Inference to any Old Explanation 11. The Inference to a Conspiracy Theory 12. Conclusion: In Defence of Conspiracy Theories Bibliography Index

Über den Autor

Matthew R. X. Dentith is a New Zealand-based philosopher whose research includes analyses of why we have grounds to be suspicious of official theories, the reliability of the transmission of rumors and the role of trust in the acceptance of theories.