D. Wirls 
The Federalist Papers and Institutional Power In American Political Development 

This book reconnects The Federalist Papers to the study of American politics and political development, arguing that the papers contain previously unrecognized theory of institutional power, a theory that enlarges and refines the contribution of the papers to political theory, but also reconnects the papers to the study of American politics.

Table of Content

1. The Federalist Theory of Institutional Power 2. The Separated Institutions Sharing Power: Powers, Organization, and Constituency in The Federalist 3. Stability, Change, and Power in the Study of Political Institutions 4. Powers, Organization, and Constituency in Early American Political Development 5. The Second Republic: The Era of Presidential Power and the Personal Branches 6. Conclusion

About the author

Daniel Wirls is Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, USA. He writes and teaches about Congress, the Senate, military policy, the separation of powers, and American political history. His most recent book is Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama (2010). He is also co-author of The Invention of the United States Senate (2004), among other works.