Gary R. Hess 
Vietnam 
Explaining America’s Lost War

Now available in a completely revised and updated second edition,
Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War is an
award-winning historiography of one of the 20th
century’s seminal conflicts.

* Looks at many facets of Vietnam War, examining central
arguments of scholars, journalists, and participants and providing
evidence on both sides of controversies around this event

* Addresses key debates about the Vietnam War, asking whether the
war was necessary for US security; whether President Kennedy would
have avoided the war had he lived beyond November 1963; whether
negotiation would have been a feasible alternative to war; and
more

* Assesses the lessons learned from this war, and how these
lessons have affected American national security policy since

* Written by a well-respected scholar in the field in an
accessible style for students and scholars

Table of Content

Preface viii

1 From the Streets to the Books: The Origins of an Enduring Debate 1

2 A Necessary War or a Mistaken War? 23

3 ‘Kennedy Exceptionalism, ‘ ‘Missed Opportunity for Peace, ‘ or ‘Lost Victory?’: The Movement toward War, 1961-1965 49

4 The Revisionist Critique of the ‘Strategy for Defeat’: The Clausewitzian Alternative 84

5 The Revisionist Critique of the ‘Other War’: The ‘Hearts-and-Minds’ Prescription for Victory 111

6 The Media and the War: Irresponsible or Balanced Journalism? 133

7 The Tet Offensive: Decisive American Victory or Devastating Loss? 155

8 Nixon-Kissinger and the Ending of the War: A ‘Lost Victory’ or ‘Neither Peace nor Honor?’ 179

9 Conclusion: The War’s ‘Lessons’ 209

Bibliography 218

Index 221

About the author

Gary R. Hess is Distinguished Research Professor of History
at Bowling Green State University, where he taught for forty-five
years. His publications include The United States at War,
1941-1945 (Wiley, 3rd edition, 2010),
Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian
Gulf, and Iraq (rev. ed., 2009), Vietnam and the United
States: Origins and Legacy of War 1941-1945 (1998), and
The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian
Power (1987).