Juan Diego Morales Otero 
The emergence of mind in a Physical world 

The emergence of mind in a physical world presents an ontologically and methodologically well founded physicalist proposal that does not lose sight of the special particularity and alleged irreducibility of some of the most obvious phenomena of our existence, such as the human mind. The author provides a compelling argument against the most widely accepted interpretation of physicalism, microphysicalism, highlighting its deep empirical and conceptual problems, as well as an insightful response to the reiterated critiques leveled by some reductionist philosophers, especially Jaegwon Kim, at the non-reductive physicalist explanation of the causal relevance of mental and higher level properties. Morales argues in favor of emergentism as a non-reductive physicalist proposal that explains the causal reality of higher-level properties as metaphysically bases. This novel interpretation will be of great interest to scholars working in the field of philosophy of mind.

Table of Content

Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter 1. Causation: A Non-Reductive Approach
The Nature of Causal Entities
Causation and Laws of Nature
Counterfactual Theory of Causation
Causation and Locality
Probability and Intervention
Causal Context and the Possibility of Causation in the Special Sciences
Summary
Chapter 2. The Concept of the Physical and the Overcoming of the Supervenience Theory
What Physicalism Is
Physicalism as a Contingent Theory
What Is It To Be Physical?
Microphysical Supervenience as the Criterion for the Physical
The Empirical Failure of Microphysicalism
Consequences for Determining the Concept of the Physical
Finding a Solution to our Problem
Summary
Chapter 3. Emergentism as Type Macrophysicalism
The Idea of Ontological Emergence
Emergentism as Type Macrophysicalism
Reductive and Non-Reductive Microphysicalism
Property Dualism and Contingent Connections
Emergence and Metaphysical Dependence
Two Types of Ontological Emergence
Summary

Chapter 4. Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Problem of Causation in the Special Sciences
Supervenience and Multiple Realizability
The Causal Exclusion Argument
The Supervenience Argument
The Principle of Physical Causal Closure
The Exclusion Principle
The Interventionist Account of Exclusion
The Argument of Causal Individuation of Natural Kinds
Higher Causal Powers as Identical to Lower Causal Powers
The Subset Account of Realization
Summary
Chapter 5. Emergent, Downward, and Mental Causation
The Idea of Emergent Causation
The Principle of Physical Causal Closure of Emergentism
Emergent and Lower Level Causal Powers
Testing the Causal Relevance of Higher Level Properties
Emergent Causation at the Quantum Level
Mental Causation as Emergent Causation
Summary
Appendix: Functional Reduction of the Special Properties
Conclusion
References
Index

About the author

Autores
Tomás Barrero
Egberto Bermúdez
Beatriz Castro Carvajal
Luis Carlos Colón Llamas
Iván González Puccetti
David Jiménez
Rocío Londoño
Rubén Sierra Mejía
Leonardo Tovar González
Clara Helena Sánchez