Karen Green 
Dummett 
Philosophy of Language

Michael Dummett stands out among his generation as the only British
philosopher of language to rival in stature the Americans, Davidson
and Quine. In conjunction with them he has been responsible for
much of the framework within which questions concerning meaning and
understanding are raised and answered in the late twentieth-century
Anglo-American tradition. Dummett’s output has been prolific and
highly influential, but not always as accessible as it deserves to
be. This book sets out to rectify this situation.

Karen Green offers the first comprehensive introduction to
Dummett’s philosophy of language, providing an overview and summary
of his most important arguments. She argues that Dummett should not
be understood as a determined advocate of anti-realism, but that
his greatest contribution to the philosophy of language is to have
set out the strengths and weaknesses of the three most influential
positions within contemporary theory of meaning – realism, as
epitomised by Frege, the holism to be found in Wittgenstein, Quine
and Davidson and the constructivism which can be extracted from
Brouwer. It demonstrates that analytic philosophy as Dummett
practices it, is by no means an outmoded approach to thinking about
language, but that it is relevant both to cognitive science and to
phenomenology.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction.

Fregean Foundations.

Sense and Reference in Frege and Dummett.

Truth Assertion and the Central Argument Against Bivalence.

Frege’s Platonism.

Frege’s Kantian Connections.

The Context Principle.

Wittgenstein and Quine.

The Manifestability Constraint and Rejection of Mentalism.

Dummett and Quine.

Two Challenges: Holism and Strict Finitism.

The Manifestability Constraint and the Priority of Language.

How do Anti-Mentalism and Anti-Psychologism Stand to Each
Other?.

The Influence of Intuitionism .

Brouwer’s Intuitionism.

The Intuitionist Case Against Bivalence.

Metaphysical debates and the Theory of Meaning.

The Traditional case for Nominalism and Subjective Idealism.

Moderate Idealism and the Denial of Bivalence.

The Case Against Strict Finitism.

Pure versus Mediated Constructivism: Truth Theories and
Semantics.

A Common-Sense Realist Appropriation of the Argument Against
Bivalence.

The Reality of the Past.

Anti-Realism with Respect to the Past.

Anti-Realism with Respect to the Future.

What Do We Know When We Know A Language?.

Languages and Idiolects.

Davidson on Malapropism and the Social Character of
Meaning.

Psychologism, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind.

On the Relationship of Phenomenology to Analytic Philosophy.

How Close are Frege and Husserl on Sense and Reference?.

Wittgenstein and Intentionality.

Conclusion.

Notes.

Bibliography

Über den Autor

Karen Green is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Monash University, Australia.