Maria van der Schaar 
Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic 

This compelling reevaluation of the relationship between logic and knowledge affirms the key role that the notion of judgement must play in such a review. The commentary repatriates the concept of judgement in the discussion, banished in recent times by the logical positivism of Wittgenstein, Hilbert and Schlick, and the Platonism of Bolzano. The volume commences with the insights of Swedish philosopher Per Martin-Löf, the father of constructive type theory, for whom logic is a demonstrative science in which judgement is a settled feature of the landscape. His paper opens the first of four sections that examine, in turn, historical philosophical assessments of judgement and reason; their place in early modern philosophy; the notion of judgement and logical theory in Wolff, Kant and Neo-Kantians like Windelband; their development in the Husserlian phenomenological paradigm; and the work of Bolzano, Russell and Frege. The papers, whose authors include Per Martin-Löf, Göran Sundholm, Michael Della Rocca and Robin Rollinger, represent a finely judged editorial selection highlighting work on philosophers exercised by the question of whether or not an epistemic notion of judgement has a role to play in logic. The volume will be of profound interest to students and academicians for its application of historical developments in philosophy to the solution of vexatious contemporary issues in the foundation of logic. ​

Table des matières

Preface.- Part 1. Constructivism, Judgement, and Reason.- Chapter 1. Verificationism then and now: Per Martin-Löf.- Chapter 2. Demonstrations versus Proofs, being an afterword to ‘Constructions, Proofs and the meaning of Logical Constants’: Göran Sundholm.- Chapter 3. Containment and Variation: Two Strands in the Development of Analyticity from Aristotle to Martin-Löf: Göran Sundholm.- Part 2. Judgement and Reason in the Seventeenth Century.- Chapter 4. Decartes’ Theory of Judgement: Warranted Assertions, the Key to Science: Elodie Cassan.- Chapter 5. Striving, Oomph, and Intelligibility in Spinoza: Michael Della Rocca.- Part 3. Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Bolzano.- Chapter 6. The Role of Wolff’s Analysis of Judgments in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation: Johan Blok.- Chapter 7. Windelband on ‘Beurteilung’: Arnaud Dewalque.- Chapter 8. A Priori Knowledge in Bolzano; Conceptual Truths and Judgements: Stefan Roski.- Part 4. Husserl, Frege and Russell.- Chapter 9. Immanent and Real States of Affairs in Husserl’s Early Theory of Judgement: Robin Rollinger.- Chapter 10. Frege and Russell on Assertion: Jeremy Kelly.​