H. Ben-Yami 
Descartes’ Philosophical Revolution: A Reassessment 

Ben-Yami shows how the technology of Descartes’ time shapes his conception of life, soul and mind–body dualism; how Descartes’ analytic geometry helps him develop his revolutionary conception of representation without resemblance; and how these ideas combine to shape his new and influential theory of perception.

Inhoudsopgave

Preface 1. Introduction 2. Descartes’ Theory of Perception 2.1 Descartes’ Theory of Perception, from The World On 2.2 Descartes’ Justification of his Theory 2.3 The Innovation in Descartes’ Theory of Perception 3. The Development of Descartes’ Theory of Perception 3.1 Descartes’ Theory of Perception in the Rules 3.2 Galileo’s Influence 3.3 Analytic Geometry and Representational Perception 4. Soul and Physiology 4.1 The Living Body according to Descartes 4.2 Life without Soul, Soul without Life 4.3 The Physiologists’ Reception of Descartes’ Conception of Life 5. Mind, Machine, Sensation 5.1 Mind and Automaton 5.2 Animals without a Mind 5.3 Painless Pain, Blind Sight 6. Descartes and the Metaphysical Project 6.1 Bérulle and Descartes 6.2 Why was the Meditations Written? 6.3 Augustine and Descartes: Methodological Preliminaries 7. The Meditations: Borrowed Themes with Original Variations 7.1 The First Meditation and the Dream Argument 7.2 Cogito: ergo sum or ergo vivo? 7.3 The Essence of the Wax, and of Bodies Generally 8. Epilogue

Over de auteur

Hanoch Ben-Yami is professor at the Department of Philosophy of Central European University, Budapest. In addition to his work on Early Modern Philosophy, his publications include papers on logic, language, mind, time and causality in Special Relativity, medical ethics and Wittgenstein, as well as a satirical play about experimental philosophy.