Stephen Petro 
Rationality, Virtue, and Liberation 
A Post-Dialectical Theory of Value

Introduction.- Chapter I: Rethinking Rationality; 1.1 The Reconciliation of Ethical Rationalism, Ethical Naturalism, Virtue Ethics, and the Biological and Social Sciences; 1.2: The Failure of Axiological Anti-Foundationalism; 1.3: The Concept of Rationality: Toward a Universal Model.- Chapter II: Rationality and Dialectical Necessity; 2.1: Prescription, Preference, and Dialectical Contingence; 2.2: Developing a Method of Justification; 2.3: A Sound Positive Account, Part I: An Analysis of Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism; 2.4: A Sound Positive Account, Part II: An Analysis of Habermas’s Discourse Ethics.- Chapter III: The Dialectical Structure of Value Judgments; 3.1: The Dialectical Structure of ‘Ought’ and ‘Must’; 3.2: The Dialectical Structure of Rights and Duties.- Chapter IV: Rationality, Virtue, and the Search for Intrinsic Goodness; 4.1: Magnell’s Challenge; 4.2: Problems in Searle’s Epistemology of Function; 4.3: The Life Framework: The Significance of Foot’s Virtue Theory Chapter V: Beyond Dialectical Necessity: Assertoric Necessity and the Grammar of Goodness; 5.1: Reflexive Intrinsicality & The Teleologically Comparative Tendential Necessity of Functions; 5.2: The Summum.- Bonum Conclusion.