N. Unwin 
Aiming at Truth 

This book argues that it is not obvious what we means by saying our beliefs and assertions are ‘truth-directed’. Do we weaken our notion of a belief if we deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism? This book defends a radically new ‘ecological’ model of knowledge, examining what might happen if we abandoned genuine belief.

Содержание

Introduction Truth and the Norms of Assertion Scepticism — And How Not to Avoid it Cognitive Contingency Belief and Acceptance Belief and Knowledge Pragmatism and the Value of Truth Relativism and the Limits of Conversability Mind, World and Realism Bibliography Index

Об авторе

NICHOLAS UNWIN studied at the University of Oxford. He has taught at the Universities of Oxford and Essex, and is now Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Bolton.