G. Banham 
Kant’s Transcendental Imagination 

The role and place of transcendental psychology in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has been a source of some contention. The acceptance of the notion of transcendental psychology in recent years has been in connection to functionalist views of the mind which has detracted from its metaphysical significance. This work presents a detailed argument for restoring transcendental psychology to a central place in the interpretation of Kant’s Analytic, in the process providing a detailed response to more ‘austere’ analytic readings.

Зміст

Acknowldgements Introduction Synthesis and Intuition Judgment and Austerity Apperception and Synthesis Synthesis and Imagination Schematism and Imagination Synthesis, Intuition and Mathematics Substance, Causality and Community Notes Bibliography Index

Про автора

GARY BANHAM is a Reader in Transcendental Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. He is the author of
Kant’s Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine and
Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics. He is the editor of
Husserl and the Logic of Experience and co-editor of
Evil Spirits: Nihilism and the Fate of Modernity.