Any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways faces a problem: While we acknowledge that others stand to benefit from intellectual advice, each and every one of us tends to consider ourselves an exception, on account of overconfidence. The solution? Accept a form of epistemic paternalism.
Table des matières
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended Bibliography IndexA propos de l’auteur
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. He specializes in social epistemology and epistemic normativity.
Langue Anglais ● Format PDF ● Pages 194 ● ISBN 9781137313171 ● Taille du fichier 0.8 MB ● Maison d’édition Palgrave Macmillan UK ● Lieu London ● Pays GB ● Publié 2013 ● Téléchargeable 24 mois ● Devise EUR ● ID 4971644 ● Protection contre la copie DRM sociale