Any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways faces a problem: While we acknowledge that others stand to benefit from intellectual advice, each and every one of us tends to consider ourselves an exception, on account of overconfidence. The solution? Accept a form of epistemic paternalism.
表中的内容
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended Bibliography Index关于作者
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. He specializes in social epistemology and epistemic normativity.
语言 英语 ● 格式 PDF ● 网页 194 ● ISBN 9781137313171 ● 文件大小 0.8 MB ● 出版者 Palgrave Macmillan UK ● 市 London ● 国家 GB ● 发布时间 2013 ● 下载 24 个月 ● 货币 EUR ● ID 4971644 ● 复制保护 社会DRM