Gary R. Hess 
Vietnam 
Explaining America’s Lost War

Now available in a completely revised and updated second edition,
Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War is an
award-winning historiography of one of the 20th
century’s seminal conflicts.

* Looks at many facets of Vietnam War, examining central
arguments of scholars, journalists, and participants and providing
evidence on both sides of controversies around this event

* Addresses key debates about the Vietnam War, asking whether the
war was necessary for US security; whether President Kennedy would
have avoided the war had he lived beyond November 1963; whether
negotiation would have been a feasible alternative to war; and
more

* Assesses the lessons learned from this war, and how these
lessons have affected American national security policy since

* Written by a well-respected scholar in the field in an
accessible style for students and scholars

विषयसूची

Preface viii

1 From the Streets to the Books: The Origins of an Enduring Debate 1

2 A Necessary War or a Mistaken War? 23

3 ‘Kennedy Exceptionalism, ‘ ‘Missed Opportunity for Peace, ‘ or ‘Lost Victory?’: The Movement toward War, 1961-1965 49

4 The Revisionist Critique of the ‘Strategy for Defeat’: The Clausewitzian Alternative 84

5 The Revisionist Critique of the ‘Other War’: The ‘Hearts-and-Minds’ Prescription for Victory 111

6 The Media and the War: Irresponsible or Balanced Journalism? 133

7 The Tet Offensive: Decisive American Victory or Devastating Loss? 155

8 Nixon-Kissinger and the Ending of the War: A ‘Lost Victory’ or ‘Neither Peace nor Honor?’ 179

9 Conclusion: The War’s ‘Lessons’ 209

Bibliography 218

Index 221

लेखक के बारे में

Gary R. Hess is Distinguished Research Professor of History
at Bowling Green State University, where he taught for forty-five
years. His publications include The United States at War,
1941-1945 (Wiley, 3rd edition, 2010),
Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian
Gulf, and Iraq (rev. ed., 2009), Vietnam and the United
States: Origins and Legacy of War 1941-1945 (1998), and
The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian
Power (1987).