Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson 
Rationality, Time, and Self 

This book provides a new argument for the tensed theory of time and emergentism about the self. This argument derives in part from theories which establish our nature as rational and emotional beings whose behavior is responsive to reasons which are facts. It is argued that there must be reasons, hence facts, that can only be captured by tensed and/or first-personal language if our behavior is to be by and large rational and appropriate. This establishes the tensed theory of time and emergentism or dualism about the self, given the physical body can plausibly be fully described non-first-personally. In the course of this discussion the book also clarifies and defends a notion of fact and responds to Mc Taggart’s paradox and Wittgenstein’s private language argument.

Mục lục

Chapter 1: Introduction

PART I: INDEXICALS AND RATIONALITY


Chapter 2: Tense and Emotions


Chapter 3: Indexicals and Actions


PART II: RATIONALITY


Chapter 4: Reasons


Chapter 5: Acting for a Reason


Chapter 6: Rationality


PART III: THE REALITY OF TENSE AND EMERGENCE OF THE SELF


Chapter 7: The Argument from Rational Action


Chapter 8: Implications for Non-indexical Cases


Chapter 9: The Argument from Appropriate Emotions


Chapter 10: Time and Self


Chapter 11: Closing Remarks

Giới thiệu về tác giả

Olley Pearson is currently Teaching Fellow in the philosophy department at Durham University, UK, where he was previously a Research Fellow. He has published papers on various topics including the nature of time, the emotions, the first person, and emergence.