Peter Forsyth & Jürgen Müller 
Economic Regulation of Urban and Regional Airports 
Incentives, Efficiency and Benchmarking

This book offers new insights into the theory and practice of economic airport regulation. In light of recent developments in aviation markets and policy, and the debate on airport regulation and benchmarking, it offers case studies on various aspects of economic regulation of city and regional airports. Written by experts in the field, the volume features contributions on the theory of regulation and benchmarking, as well as case studies on recent experiences in Europe and Latin America.

This book is divided into three parts: Part I provides the theoretical background for the study of airport regulation and regulatory systems. Competition at airports is discussed, as are common forms of regulation and potential pitfalls. Part II addresses benchmarking, as benchmarking is often applied as an input to the regulatory process. Although benchmarking is necessary, reviews of how benchmarking is applied in the literature and in practice show that improvements can be made. Part III providescase studies on real-world examples.

Addressing the question of whether and how European airport regulators set incentives for efficiency, and how benchmarking is used in the regulatory process, this book is an important contribution to the development of the transport industry in Europe and Latin America. It will appeal to scholars and students in transport economics, regional economics and related fields, as well as to practitioners and policy makers in the transport industry.

Mục lục

– 1. Introduction. - 
Part I Theoretical Background: Market Power and Regulation. – 2. How Strong Is Airport Competition: Is There a Case for Regulation?. – 3. European Hub Airport Competition: An Assessment of Market Concentration in the Local Catchment and in the Transfer Market. – 4. The Transactions Costs Foundation for Public Utility Regulation and Its Application to the Regulation of Airports. – 5. Cost-Based Versus Incentive Regulation for Airports. – 6. Airport Privatization and Regulation: Effects on Airport Charge, Capacity, and Social Welfare. – 7. Light-Handed Regulation of Airports: The Way to Go?. – 8. Optimising Investment in Regulated Airports. – 9. European Airport Reform: Slots and the Implicit Contract Between Airlines and Airports. - 
Part II Benchmarking. – 10. Efficiency Assessment of Airports and the Impact of Regulation on Performance. – 11. Methodology Choices for Benchmarking Airports. – 12. Practical Difficulties in Airport Benchmarking: The Case of Dublin Airport. - 
Part III Country Studies. – 13. Economic Regulation of Airports in the United Kingdom. – 14. French Airports Case Study. – 15. Airport Regulation and Benchmarking: Case Study Germany. – 16. Airport Market Power: Schiphol 10 Years After the Assessment. – 17. Changing Governance and Regulation of Airports: A Comparison of Austria, Denmark, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, and Spain. – 18. Private Participation and Economic Regulation of Airports in Latin America. – 19. Conclusion.

Giới thiệu về tác giả

P
eter Forsyth has been at Monash University since 1997, originally as Professor of Economics, and since 2014 as Adjunct Professor. Much of his research has been on Transport Economics, and especially on the Economics of Aviation. He has published widely in both tourism and aviation, including 
Tourism Economics and Policy,  
Second Edition, (with L Dwyer and W Dwyer, Channel View, 2020). In recent years he has done considerable research on economic policies to reduce emissions of aviation, and recently published 
Aviation and Climate Change: Economic Perspectives on Greenhouse Gas Reduction Polices (with F Fichert and H-M Niemeier, Routledge, 2020). He has also done extensive work using Computable General Equilibrium models to analyse aviation policy issues. In 2015 he was made a Fellow of the Air Transport Research Society. 
Jürgen Müller obtained his Ph D from Stanford and then worked at the Science Center Berlin (WZB), the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) and the Berlin School of Economics and Law (HWR), at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and at Sussex University. He also taught at the Universities of Bonn, Bremen, Paris-Sorbonne, INSEAD, Stanford, UC Berkeley and the College of Europe/Natolin. Concerning aviation, he has worked on air traffic control issues for the Association of European Airlines and for the European Union and as a co-director of the German Aviation Project (GAP) on governance and productivity topics. He was a co-founder of the European Association of Industrial Economics (EARIE) and the International Telecommunications Society (ITS) and a vice chair of GARS, the German Aviation Research Society. 
Hans-Martin Niemeier is a Director of the Institute for Transport and Development at Bremen University of Applied Sciences. He is Chairman of the German Aviation Research Society and member of the Advisory Board of the European Aviation Conference. He chaired the COST Action “Air Transport and Regional Development”. From 2014 to May 2019, he was member of the Performance Review Body of the Single European Sky. He has published on privatisation, regulation and competition of airports, the reform of slot allocation and on airline and airport alliances. 
Eric Pels is Associate Professor at the Department of Spatial Economic of VU University. He obtained his Ph D in 2000 from VU University. The title of the doctoral dissertation was: ‘Airport economics and policy: efficiency, competition, and interaction with airlines’. With this dissertation he was the winner of the Regional Science Association International (RSAI) Dissertation Competition, 2000. Currently he teaches various courses at the bachelor’s and master’s level. These courses include transport economics, airline business and micro economics. His research focuses on the development of transport (mostly airline) networks, pricing transport network and pricing of infrastructure. He chaired the 2019 ATRS conference. He also is editor submitted papers for Transport Policy.